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TRIPS AND COMPULSORY LICENSING: INCREASING
PARTICIPATION IN THE MEDICINES PATENT POOL IN THE
WAKE OF AN HIV/AIDS TREATMENT TIMEBOMB
ABSTRACT
Significant progress has been made in recent decades to increase access to
HIV/AIDS antiretroviral treatments in low- and middle-income countries.
Despite all that has been done, a treatment timebomb awaits unless immediate
action is taken to decrease the price of antiretroviral drugs. The treatment
timebomb can be attributed in part to the increasing likelihood that HIV
medicines will be patented in developing countries in compliance with the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).
The Medicines Patent Pool (MPP) is a collective action mechanism designed
to overcome patent barriers resulting from the implementation of TRIPS in
developing countries to respond to the treatment timebomb. The MPP works
directly with HIV medicines patent holders and generic manufacturers to
facilitate access to new and more affordable antiretrovirals in developing
countries. This Comment argues that the MPP can serve as a valuable tool to
increase access to patented HIV medicines in developing countries if
participation in the pool by patent holders can be increased. This Comment
proposes that governments in countries hardest hit by the HIV/AIDS epidemic
collectively exercise TRIPS flexibilities and issue compulsory licenses for HIV
medicines to increase participation in the MPP. Such a concerted effort by
low- and middle-income countries to issue compulsory licenses could make the
MPP more effective at increasing access to new and more affordable HIV
medicines to respond to the growing HIV/AIDS treatment crisis.
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INTRODUCTION
[W]e are sitting on a treatment timebomb. We can predict many of
the changing treatment needs of people living with HIV in the coming
decade and they are not compatible with treatments and prices
available today. Maintaining HIV treatment to keep people alive will
cripple developing economies, or place unbearable strains on richer
countries trying to support them. Action is needed now, to avert crisis
later.
—United Kingdom All-Party Parliamentary
Group on AIDS1

In 2012, an estimated 35.3 million people worldwide were living with
HIV.2 That number is expected to increase five-fold by 2030.3 The magnitude
of this increase is due in part to growing drug resistance,4 rising treatment
prices,5 the increasing likelihood that new antiretroviral drugs will be patented
in developing countries,6 and inadequate funding for low- and middle-income
countries to purchase medicines.7 To respond to this so-called “treatment
timebomb,”8 a new collective action mechanism is needed to facilitate access
to patented antiretroviral drugs to produce more affordable medicines and
develop improved medicines.9
The Medicines Patent Pool (MPP) is a new approach to managing
intellectual property created to respond to the treatment timebomb and
overcome patent barriers imposed by the implementation of the Agreement on

1 UNAIDS, GLOBAL REPORT: UNAIDS REPORT ON THE GLOBAL AIDS EPIDEMIC 4 (2013) [hereinafter
UNAIDS GLOBAL REPORT]. In 2009, only one-third of adults living with HIV had access to treatment. ALLPARTY PARLIAMENTARY GROUP ON AIDS, THE TREATMENT TIMEBOMB 5 (2009) [hereinafter TREATMENT
TIMEBOMB].
2 UNAIDS GLOBAL REPORT, supra note 1.
3 Drug Firms ‘Must Pool Patents’, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/8150457.stm (last
updated July 15, 2009). According to one estimate, approximately fifty-five million people will need access to
antiretroviral treatments by 2030. TREATMENT TIMEBOMB, supra note 1.
4 TREATMENT TIMEBOMB, supra note 1, at 12.
5 Id. at 10.
6 See Ellen ‘t Hoen, Jonathan Berger, Alexandra Calmy & Suerie Moon, Driving a Decade of Change:
HIV/AIDS, Patents and Access to Medicines For All, 14 J. INT’L AIDS SOC’Y 1, 7 (2011) [hereinafter ‘t Hoen
et al., Driving a Decade of Change].
7 See id. at 8.
8 The United Kingdom All Party Parliamentary Group on AIDS coined the term “treatment timebomb”
in July 2009. Id. at 8.
9 See id. at 1.
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Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) in 1995.10
Following the implementation of TRIPS, HIV medicines are more likely to be
patented in developing countries and thus less widely available to generic
manufacturers.11 The MPP works with patent holders and generic
manufacturers to facilitate access to patented HIV medicines in developing
countries with the goal of supporting the production of affordable generic
medicines, and the development of new treatments.12 The MPP represents a
promising mechanism to respond to the treatment timebomb and overcome the
patent barriers described above.13 The MPP, however, faces its own problems
in providing adequate incentives for patent holders to voluntarily license their
HIV medicines patents to the pool.14
This Comment argues that the MPP can facilitate access to less expensive
and more effective antiretrovirals if participation by relevant patent holders can
be increased. This Comment proposes that governments in countries hardest hit
by the HIV/AIDS epidemic and the least able to pay for essential antiretroviral
treatments collectively issue compulsory licenses to increase participation in
the MPP. Compulsory licensing can provide a legal solution under TRIPS to
increase participation in the MPP and overcome the patent barriers imposed by
TRIPS. A concerted effort by low- and middle-income countries to issue
compulsory licenses could make the MPP more effective at increasing access
to new and more affordable HIV medicines to respond to the growing
HIV/AIDS treatment crisis.
Part I of this Comment introduces patent pools and the HIV/AIDS
treatment timebomb, and details the creation of the MPP, including the MPP’s
licensing strategy and licensing successes to date. Part II reviews the incentives
for patent holders to participate in the pool and examines why the current
incentives are not adequate to attract enough patent holders to the pool. Part III
introduces compulsory licensing and TRIPS to propose collective public action
through compulsory licensing as a tool to increase participation in the MPP.
Part IV concludes that the MPP is an invaluable tool for increasing access to
new and affordable HIV medicines to respond to the global treatment
10 Id. at 8. TRIPS requires all World Trade Organization members to provide a minimum level of patent
protection in all fields, including pharmaceuticals. Id. at 2–3. The implications of the implementation of TRIPS
will be discussed briefly in Part I.A and in greater detail in Part III.B of this Comment.
11 Id. at 2–3, 8.
12 Id. at 1.
13 See id.
14 See REBECCA GOULDING & AMRITA PALRIWALA, RESULTS FOR DEV. INST., PATENT POOLS: ASSESSING
THEIR VALUE-ADDED FOR GLOBAL HEALTH INNOVATION AND ACCESS 3, 33 (2012).
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timebomb and that it can be made more effective by increasing participation in
the pool through collective public action in the form of compulsory licensing.
I. THE MEDICINES PATENT POOL
This Comment argues that a patent pool for HIV medicines represents a
valuable mechanism to increase access to new and more affordable
antiretroviral treatments in developing countries. Part A introduces patent
pools and the HIV/AIDS treatment timebomb. Part B outlines the road to
creating a patent pool for HIV medicines and the MPP’s mission to increase
access to antiretroviral drugs. Part C examines the MPP’s licensing strategy
and briefly discusses licensing agreements the MPP has concluded to
demonstrate that more needs to be done before the MPP can accomplish its
mission to facilitate access to patented medicines in developing countries.
A. Patent Pools and the HIV/AIDS Treatment Timebomb
1. What is a Patent Pool?
A patent pool is an agreement between two or more patent holders to
license their patent rights to a single entity or pool.15 Once patents are licensed
to the pool, pool administrators can license the right to use the patents to third
parties, such as generic manufacturers, typically upon payment of a royalty to
the patent holder.16 Patent pools are created for a variety of reasons and can
range in size from small, cross-licensing arrangements between two or more
competitors to large, industry-wide pools including hundreds of
manufacturers.17 The benefits of creating a patent pool include reduced
transaction costs resulting from only having to negotiate licenses with a single
entity, and the management of patents, royalties, and licensing agreements by a
single pool administrator.18 Although patent pools have been used in other
industries, including agriculture and airspace engineering, since as early as
1856,19 they are relatively new in the pharmaceutical industry.20
15

Michelle Childs, Towards a Patent Pool for HIV Medicines: The Background, 4 OPEN AIDS J. 33, 34

(2010).
16

Id.
IGWG Submission on Collective Management of Intellectual Property, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L
(Sept. 30, 2007), http://www.who.int/phi/public_hearings/second/contributions_section2/Section2_ManonRess
-PatentPool.pdf [hereinafter IGWG Submission].
18 Id.
19 Jorge Bermudez & Ellen ‘t Hoen, The UNITAID Patent Pool Initiative: Bringing Patents Together for
the Common Good, 4 OPEN AIDS J. 37, 38 (2010); see also Bradley J. Levang, Evaluating the Use of Patent
17
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2. The HIV/AIDS Treatment Timebomb
Significant progress has been made in recent decades to increase access to
HIV/AIDS antiretroviral treatments in low- and middle-income countries.21
The increase in access has been primarily attributed to widespread generic
manufacturing of antiretrovirals, which has driven competition up and prices
down.22 Despite these improvements, however, a treatment timebomb awaits,
which threatens to set back the progress made unless immediate action is taken
to decrease the price of antiretroviral drugs.23 The treatment timebomb can be
attributed to a number of interrelated factors that are likely to increase the cost
of HIV treatment, decrease access to treatment, and heighten the need to find
newer, more affordable treatments. These factors include the high likelihood
that persons on antiretroviral drugs will develop resistance; inadequate funding
for medicines; the lack of a commercial market for pediatric drugs; and an
increase in the patenting of medicines in developing countries in compliance
with TRIPS.24

Pools for Biotechnology: A Refutation to the USPTO White Paper Concerning Biotechnology Patent Pools, 19
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J. 229, 236–37 (2002).
20 Medicines Patent Pool: Facilitating Access to HIV Treatment, WIPO MAG. (June 2011), http://www.
wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2011/03/article_0005.html [hereinafter WIPO MAGAZINE]. Historically, the
pharmaceutical industry has not been seen as an appropriate forum for a patent pool model for a variety of
reasons, including the importance of intellectual property in determining a pharmaceutical company’s worth
and the likelihood that pharmaceutical patent holders will disagree over the value of patents in the pool.
COMM’N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INNOVATION AND PUBLIC HEALTH, PUBLIC HEALTH, INNOVATION,
AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 53 (2006). Perceptions began to change in 2000 when the United States
Patent and Trademark Office issued a report concluding that patent pools in biotechnology could be valuable
tools to serve the interests of both public and private actors. Id.
21 See, e.g., ‘t Hoen et al., Driving a Decade of Change, supra note 6, at 7–8. Between 2003 and 2009,
the number of people with access to HIV/AIDS antiretroviral treatments increased more than twelve-fold due
to the increased availability of low-cost generic antiretrovirals, whose prices have dropped by over ninety-nine
percent since 2000. See Ellen ‘t Hoen & Suerie Moon, An Innovative Approach to Achieving Access to
Medicines For All, MEDICUS MUNDI SWITZ. (Sept. 2010), http://www.medicusmundi.ch/mms/services/
bulletin/zugang-zu-medikamenten-fur-alle/debatten-und-ansatze/24.html [hereinafter ‘t Hoen & Moon, An
Innovative Approach to Achieving Access]. The World Bank defines low-income countries as those having a
Gross National Income (GNI) per capita of $1,045 or less in 2013; middle-income countries are defined as
those having a GNI per capita of more than $1,045 but less than $12,746. Country and Lending Groups,
WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-groups (last visited Feb. 7, 2015). The
term “developing” is used to denote low- and middle-income countries. Id. The terms “low- and middleincome countries” and “developing countries” will be used interchangeably throughout this Comment.
22 Tina Rosenberg, Sharing Patents to Wipe out AIDS, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2011), http://opinionator.
blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/21/sharing-patents-to-wipe-out-aids/?_r=0.
23 See ‘t Hoen et al., Driving a Decade of Change, supra note 6, at 7–8.
24 Id. at 1, 7–8; see also TREATMENT TIMEBOMB, supra note 1, at 12.
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The number of people worldwide living with HIV is expected to increase in
the coming years, meaning that more people will need access to antiretroviral
treatments.25 Currently, the majority of people living with HIV in low- and
middle-income countries are first treated with a combination of three
antiretroviral drugs—Lamivudine, Stavudine, and Nevirapine—known as
combination treatment.26 However, merely having access to drugs does not
guarantee successful treatment, as most people who have access to
antiretrovirals develop resistance to the first set of drugs (first-line drugs) they
take.27 For these individuals, switching to a newer and more expensive set of
drugs (second-line drugs) can be “a matter of life or death.”28 An additional
complicating factor contributing to the treatment timebomb is that second-line
treatments can be up to eleven times more expensive than first-line treatments,
putting them out of reach for many HIV patients in low- and middle-income
countries.29 The high likelihood that persons receiving treatment will develop
resistance to first-line treatments over time in combination with the high cost
of second-line treatments means that newer and more affordable treatments
will be needed in the near future to avert a global treatment crisis.30 The
treatment situation is even more dire for children: only ten percent of children
who need antiretroviral treatments currently have access,31 and many of the
antiretrovirals that are currently produced are either not approved for pediatric
use or are not available in pediatric formulations.32 The simple solution is to
provide more pediatric antiretrovirals for children.33 However, the lack of a
commercial market for pediatric drugs means that there are few incentives for
pharmaceutical companies to invest in developing pediatric antiretroviral
formulations.34
While antiretroviral prices have decreased in the last two decades due to
increasing generic competition in low- and middle-income countries,
25

See ‘t Hoen et al., Driving a Decade of Change, supra note 6, at 7–8.
TREATMENT TIMEBOMB, supra note 1, at 10.
27 Id. at 12 (noting that the “development of resistance is likely to happen to everybody over time”).
28 Id.; see also ‘t Hoen et al., Driving a Decade of Change, supra note 6, at 7–8. It is estimated that only
three percent of people receiving antiretroviral treatments in developing countries are being treated with
second line drugs. TREATMENT TIMEBOMB, supra note 1, at 12.
29 See TREATMENT TIMEBOMB, supra note 1, at 10.
30 Id. at 12. Combination treatments, however, are difficult to produce because more than one person may
own the patented drugs, and manufacturers must obtain permission from all patent holders before the drugs can
be combined into a single pill. See id. at 26.
31 Id. at 6.
32 Id. at 25.
33 Id.
34 Id.
26
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antiretrovirals are still too expensive for most developing countries to purchase
and provide to their HIV-infected populations.35 As a result, many developing
countries rely on drug donation programs, funded by organizations such as the
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, and the United States’
President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) program, to assist
them in purchasing medicines.36 It is unclear how much longer this lifeline of
support will be available to developing countries: the international HIV/AIDS
community is facing a financial crisis, which has led to declining contributions
in recent years.37 If funding for drug donation programs runs out, developing
countries will be left with few options to increase access to antiretrovirals on
their own.
Finally, the treatment timebomb can be attributed in part to the increasing
likelihood that new antiretroviral drugs will be patented in developing
countries in compliance with TRIPS.38 As HIV medicines are more widely
patented in developing countries, it will become increasingly difficult for
generic manufacturers to produce low-cost versions of the patented medicines
and the cost of treatment will rise.39 In addition, it will be more difficult for
generic manufacturers to develop new combination or pediatric treatments if
the individual HIV medicines needed to produce the treatments are patented in
developing countries.40
The increase in the patenting of medicines in developing countries is
occurring in response to the adoption of TRIPS by the World Trade
Organization (WTO) in 1994.41 Under TRIPS, WTO member countries must
provide a minimum level of patent protection in all fields of technology,
including pharmaceuticals, for twenty years.42 Developing countries are often
required to provide patent protection exceeding the minimum requirements of
TRIPS as part of trade agreements with developed countries, further restricting
their ability to produce or import generic versions of patented medicines.43 The
35

Rosenberg, supra note 22.
Id.
37 See ‘t Hoen et al., Driving a Decade of Change, supra note 6, at 8.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 2. The World Trade Organization was established in 1995 to govern trade-related transactions
between nations. What is the WTO?, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/
whatis_e.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2015).
42 See ‘t Hoen et al., Driving a Decade of Change, supra note 6, at 2. In 2011, 153 countries were
members of the WTO. Id.
43 Id. at 8.
36
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situation is only going to get worse: all WTO member countries must be
TRIPS-compliant by 2016, at which time it will be virtually impossible for
generic manufacturers to produce or import low-cost versions of patented
antiretrovirals.44
A new collective action mechanism designed to facilitate access to patented
HIV medicines is needed to confront the intellectual property challenges
arising from the implementation of TRIPS. The following section discusses
how the MPP anticipated and can overcome these problems by working
directly with patent holders and generic manufacturers to produce and develop
newer and more affordable antiretroviral treatments.45
B. Overcoming Patent Barriers by Creating a Patent Pool for HIV Medicines
Part B provides a short overview of the MPP and its mission to establish a
backdrop within which to evaluate the MPP’s ability to overcome patent
barriers and facilitate access to patented HIV medicines.
1. The Road to Creating a Patent Pool for HIV Medicines
James Love from Knowledge Ecology International (KEI)46 first introduced
the idea for a patent pool for HIV medicines in 2002 at the International AIDS
Conference in Barcelona, Spain.47 Love, who had studied patent pools created
by the United States government in 1917 to overcome patent barriers in the
aircraft industry, believed that a similar concept could be used to overcome
patent barriers in the HIV medicines industry.48 The next step towards creating
a patent pool for HIV medicines came in 2006 when UNITAID was created to
provide “sustainable, long-term funding” for drugs and diagnostics for
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria in developing countries.49 Médicins Sans

44

TREATMENT TIMEBOMB, supra note 1, at 20.
See ‘t Hoen et al., Driving a Decade of Change, supra note 6, at 1, 8.
46 KEI is a not-for-profit organization that engages in research and advocacy to manage knowledge
resources in areas of intellectual property, among others. About KEI, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L, http://
keionline.org/about (last visited Dec. 13, 2014).
47 See ‘t Hoen et al., Driving a Decade of Change, supra note 6, at 8.
48 Id.; see also GOULDING & PALRIWALA, supra note 14, at 12.
49 Bermudez & ‘t Hoen, supra note 19, at 38. UNITAID was launched by the governments of Brazil,
Chile, France, Norway, and the United Kingdom in 2006. Id. UNITAID is an innovative drug purchasing
mechanism that obtains funding through a tax on airline tickets in participating member countries and through
contributions from organizations such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the Clinton HIV/AIDS
Initiative. Id. As of 2010, twenty-nine countries had committed to contribute to UNITAID, the majority of
45
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Frontières (MSF),50 with support from KEI, submitted a proposal to create a
patent pool for HIV medicines to UNITAID and the French Ministry of
Foreign Affairs in June 2006.51 At that time, UNITAID was perceived as the
best entity to implement the patent pool initiative because it takes a “pro-health
approach to IP.”52 UNITAID adopted the proposal in July 2008,53 and the MPP
was launched as an independent entity in July 2010 with funding from
UNITAID.54 UNITAID hoped the MPP would complement other mechanisms
that it utilizes to increase access to HIV medicines in developing countries
such as financing and drug purchasing programs.55
2. The MPP as a Mechanism to Overcome Patent Barriers and Increase
Access to Medicines
The MPP was created as a direct response to the changing global
intellectual property environment arising from the increased likelihood that
HIV medicines would be patented in developing countries in compliance with
TRIPS.56 Under TRIPS, patented medicines are not available in generic form
until the twenty-year term for patent protection expires, which means that
countries hardest hit by the HIV/AIDS epidemic will have to wait a long time
before more affordable medicines are made available.57 The MPP was
designed to overcome barriers imposed by patent protection for medicines in
developing countries through the collective management of HIV medicines
patents in a single pool with a global health goal in mind.58
The MPP’s mission is to “reduce prices and ensure the availability of new
and improved AIDS medicines” by producing generic versions of HIV
antiretrovirals and developing new combination and pediatric therapies.59
which were low- or middle-income. Id. UNITAID has already experienced “considerable success” in reducing
drug prices through bulk purchasing agreements. TREATMENT TIMEBOMB, supra note 1, at 15.
50 Médicins Sans Frontières, also known as Doctors Without Borders, is a medical humanitarian
organization that provides medical care to people affected by armed conflict, natural disasters, and global
epidemics, or who otherwise lack access to adequate medical care. About MSF, MÉDICINS SANS FRONTIÈRES,
http://www.msf.org/about-msf (last visited Jan. 3, 2015).
51 Childs, supra note 15, at 34.
52 Bermudez & ‘t Hoen, supra note 19, at 38.
53 Id.
54 WIPO MAGAZINE, supra note 20; see also GOULDING & PALRIWALA, supra note 14, at 19.
55 Bermudez & ‘t Hoen, supra note 19, at 38.
56 See ‘t Hoen et al., Driving a Decade of Change, supra note 6, at 8.
57 Rosenberg, supra note 22.
58 Childs, supra note 15, at 34; see also ‘t Hoen et al., Driving a Decade of Change, supra note 6, at 8.
59 See ‘t Hoen & Moon, An Innovative Approach to Achieving Access, supra note 21; see also ‘t Hoen et
al., Driving a Decade of Change, supra note 6, at 1, 8.
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Combination treatments are essential for simplifying and improving HIV care
in developing countries; however, they are difficult to develop because more
than one owner may hold the patents needed to make the combination.60 As
discussed in Part I.A, pediatric treatments are essential due to the unmet
treatment need and lack of investment in developing pediatric formulations.61
The MPP pools patents held by multiple owners in a single entity to make
it easier for generic manufactures to access patented medicines that otherwise
would only be available to them on a license-by-license basis.62 Such access
can lead to lower drug prices and encourage the development of new
medicines, including the pediatric and combination treatments that are
desperately needed in developing countries, on a shorter timeframe by
simulating competition among generic manufacturers.63
In order to facilitate access to patented HIV medicines, the MPP negotiates
licensing agreements separately with patent holders and generic
manufacturers.64 Key to the MPP’s success is that it negotiates licensing
agreements from a global health rather than from a financial perspective and
operates as an intermediary between patent holders and generic
manufacturers.65 The MPP’s status as a non-financially-motivated intermediary
is essential to its ability to negotiate licensing agreements that will increase
access to more affordable patented medicines in developing countries.66 In
addition, the MPP’s intermediary status is attractive to generic manufacturers,
who often have difficulty negotiating favorable bilateral licensing agreements
with large, financially superior pharmaceutical companies.67
The MPP has been well received throughout the international community
and seen as a positive step towards decreasing drug prices and increasing

60

See Bermudez & ‘t Hoen, supra note 19, at 37. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
See TREATMENT TIMEBOMB, supra note 1, at 6, 25.
62 Asher Mullard, Straight Talk With Ellen ‘t Hoen, 16 NATURE MED. 1351, 1351 (2010). See ‘t Hoen et
al., Driving a Decade of Change, supra note 6, at 8. By pooling medicines patents together, researchers can
“access permission to use the component drugs from a single place, rather than having to negotiate company
by company.” TREATMENT TIMEBOMB, supra note 1, at 28.
63 See IGWG Submission, supra note 17; ‘t Hoen et al., Driving a Decade of Change, supra note 6, at 6.
See also Rosenberg, supra note 22 (noting that patent pools can make patented medicines available to generic
manufacturers right away).
64 See GOULDING & PALRIWALA, supra note 14, at 34.
65 See id.
66 See id.; Mullard, supra note 62, at 1351.
67 GOULDING & PALRIWALA, supra note 14, at 3.
61
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access in developing countries.68 Since it was created, the MPP has received
extensive political support from countries including the United Kingdom, the
United States, Thailand, and Brazil,69 which lends credibility and legitimacy to
the institution. Organizations such as the World Health Organization,
UNAIDS, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, as well
as the G8 and the European Union have also expressed support for the pool.70
While the MPP currently focuses exclusively on HIV/AIDS medicines,71 it
will eventually be expanded to address other diseases in developing countries,
including tuberculosis and malaria.72 However, scaling up the MPP to address
other diseases can only be justified if the MPP proves to be an effective
solution to responding to the current HIV/AIDS treatment crisis.73 The MPP’s
ability to serve as a valuable tool to increasing access to patented HIV
medicines depends in large part on its licensing strategy and ability to attract
key patent holders to the pool,74 which will be discussed in the following
section.
C. Licensing in the MPP
The MPP is a voluntary pool, meaning that patent holders must voluntarily
choose to license their HIV medicines patents to the pool before the patents
will be available to generic manufacturers.75 Once patents are licensed to the
pool, generic manufacturers can sublicense the right to produce and sell lowcost generic versions of the medicines in low- and middle-income countries or
to combine multiple patents to develop new combination or pediatric
treatments.76 Patent holders can receive a royalty from the sale of generic
versions of the patented medicines in low- and middle-income countries in
exchange for licensing to the MPP.77 The MPP then relies on market
competition among generic manufacturers to bring drug prices down and
increase access to treatments.78 However, robust competition will only occur if
68

See TREATMENT TIMEBOMB, supra note 1, at 28–29.
See ‘t Hoen et al., Driving a Decade of Change, supra note 6, at 6. See also Drug Firms ‘Must Pool
Patents’, supra note 3; Mullard, supra note 62, at 1351.
70 GOULDING & PALRIWALA, supra note 14, at 22.
71 Bermudez & ‘t Hoen, supra note 19, at 39.
72 Id. at 38.
73 See id.
74 See TREATMENT TIMEBOMB, supra note 1, at 28–29.
75 Bermudez & ‘t Hoen, supra note 19, at 38.
76 Id. at 38–39.
77 Id. at 38.
78 See ‘t Hoen et al., Driving a Decade of Change, supra note 6, at 8.
69
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licenses for HIV medicines are available to multiple generic manufacturers in
developing countries where the medicines are patented.79
The MPP’s licensing strategy is flexible80 to attract the maximum number
of patent holders to the pool, meaning that licensing terms are variable and
subject to negotiation.81 However, the MPP has defined at least four principles
that should guide all MPP licenses to maintain a global health-oriented
approach.82 First, the terms and conditions of all MPP licenses must be made
available to the public and all MPP licenses must be non-exclusive such that
patent holders can license to other entities besides the pool.83 Second, licenses
must be limited to low- and middle-income countries; developed countries
cannot be included within the scope of licensing agreements.84 Third, generic
manufacturers must put in place mechanisms to provide quality assurance for
the generic products to accommodate the concerns of patent holders whose
medicines they will be producing.85 Fourth, the royalties that patent holders
receive under licensing agreements must be adjusted based on the recipient
country’s HIV disease burden and ability to pay to ensure the broadest possible
access to treatment.86
The next section reviews licensing agreements concluded by the MPP since
it was created and shows that the MPP needs to attract more participation by
key patent holders to respond to the growing global health crisis.87 This
Comment argues that the MPP could still become an effective solution to the
timebomb if participation can be increased through collective action.
1. Licensing Agreements
The MPP has experienced modest success over the past five years, signing
licensing agreements for a total of twelve antiretrovirals and one drug used to

79 Id. at 6 (noting that “licenses are critical because they can encourage robust competition among drug
manufacturers” and competition drives down prices). See also id. at 8.
80 Kelly Morris, HIV Drug Patents in the Spotlight, 9 LANCET 660, 661 (2009). See also Ellen ‘t Hoen,
Pharmaceutical Companies and the UNITAID Patent Pool, 375 LANCET 30, 30 (2010) (“UNITAID has
consulted with a wide range of stakeholders in the ongoing process of designing the Pool”).
81 WIPO MAGAZINE, supra note 20.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 GOULDING & PALRIWALA, supra note 14, at 21–22.
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treat secondary infections in people living with HIV with six patent holders.88
Twelve out of eighteen antiretrovirals included on the MPP’s list of priority
medicines have been licensed to the MPP, though one cannot be produced until
another patent holder joints the pool.89 As of October 2015, the MPP had
signed fifty-nine sublicensing agreements with fourteen generic
manufacturers.90 This section will briefly discuss licensing agreements
concluded by the MPP to demonstrate that more can be done to attract key
patent holders and increase access to HIV medicines.
The MPP signed its first licensing agreement with the United States
National Institutes of Health (NIH) in September 2010.91 The NIH license is
royalty-free and permits research on a drug primarily used to treat drugresistant HIV infections.92 However, the long-term practical usefulness of the
license is limited until another patent holder, Tibotec, which owns patents on
the drug related to manufacturing, licenses to the MPP.93
In July 2011, the MPP signed its first licensing agreement with a private
pharmaceutical company, Gilead Sciences.94 A few terms of the licensing
agreement are worth mentioning to better understand the challenges the MPP
faces in concluding licensing agreements that will have a significant impact on

88

About the MPP, MEDS. PATENT POOL, http://www.medicinespatentpool.org/about/ (last visited Sept.
30, 2015); William New, Medicines Patent Pool Signs 7 New Sub-Licenses for Generic HIV Drugs, INTELL.
PROP. WATCH (July 18, 2014), http://www.ip-watch.org/2014/07/18/medicines-patent-pool-signs-7-new-sublicences-for-generic-hiv-drugs/. After this Comment was written, the MPP released a report highlighting its
successes over the past five years. To read more about the MPP’s latest achievements in greater detail, see
generally MEDS. PATENT POOL, PROGRESS AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE MEDICINES PATENT POOL 2010–2015
(2015),
http://www.medicinespatentpool.org/wp-content/uploads/WEB_Progress_Report_2015_EN.pdf
[hereinafter PROGRESS AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE MPP].
89 MEDS. PATENT POOL, ANTIRETROVIRAL PRIORITIES OF THE MEDICINES PATENT POOL 11 (4th ed. 2015)
90 See PROGRESS AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE MPP, supra note 88, at 1. As of December 2014, the MPP
had signed sub-licensing agreements with ten generic manufacturers. See Company Engagement, MEDS.
PATENT POOL, http://www.medicinespatentpool.org/company-engagement/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2015).
91 WIPO MAGAZINE, supra note 20.
92 Krista Cox, The Medicines Patent Pool: Promoting Access and Innovation for Life-Saving Medicines
Through Voluntary Licenses, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L. J. 293, 300 (2012); see also WIPO MAGAZINE,
supra note 20; Kaitlin Mara, The Medicines Patent Pool: Improving Access to ARVs and Stimulating
Innovation for New Medicines, AFR. HEALTH, Jan. 2012, at 20–21.
93 Cox, supra note 92, at 301 (noting that Tibotec has so far declined to negotiate with the MPP).
94 Id. at 304. The Gilead license covered production of the drugs tenofovir (TDF), elvitegravir (EVG) and
cobisistat (COBI), as well as a fixed-dose combination of the four drugs called the Quad; the license contains a
covenant not to sue on emtricitabine (FTC). Id.; see also Licenses in the MPP, MEDS. PATENT POOL,
http://www.medicinespatentpool.org/current-licences/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2015).
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increasing access to patented medicines in developing countries.95 For
example, the license covers generic production of three drugs, including two
pipeline drugs, used to treat HIV infections, as well as a four-drug combination
product called the Quad;96 the license permits the generic products to be sold in
112 low- and middle-income countries;97 and Gilead receives a three to five
percent royalty on sales of generic products.98 Most strikingly and the subject
of criticism, the Gilead license excluded a number of middle-income countries,
in particular in Asia and Latin America.99 In addition, the license restricted the
sourcing of active pharmaceutical ingredients and generic manufacturing of the
licensed drugs to India.100 The MPP signed a second licensing agreement with
Gilead in 2014,101 which again excluded a number of middle-income countries
such as Argentina, Brazil, China, and the Philippines.102
Since concluding the initial licensing agreement with Gilead, the MPP has
signed licensing agreements with Bristol-Myers Squibb in 2013,103 ViiV
Healthcare in April 2014,104 and with AbbVie in 2014.105 In addition, the MPP
signed a Memorandum of Understanding with ViiV Healthcare in 2013 for

95 See infra Part II.A for a detailed discussion of the incentives to participate in the MPP. See infra Part
II.B for a discussion of the problems the MPP must overcome before it can attract patent holders and
effectively respond to the global health crisis.
96 Cox, supra note 92, at 304; see also Morris, supra note 80, at 660.
97 Cox, supra note 92, at 306, 308.
98 Id. at 308.
99 Id. at 306 (noting that “[t]he exclusion of a number of middle-income countries, particularly those in
Asia and Latin America, represents one of the main criticisms of the MPP/Gilead license”).
100 Id. at 309.
101 Licenses in the MPP, supra note 94. The agreement was amended in June 2015 to cover generic
production of EVG in China and South Africa and to include a license to manufacture a combination of
TDF/FTC with efavirenz (EFV). Id.
102 Catherine Saez, New Medicines Patent Pool-Gilead Agreement for New HIV Drug in 112 Countries,
INTELL. PROP. WATCH (July 24, 2014), http://www.ip-watch.org/2014/07/24/new-medicines-patent-poolgilead-agreement-for-new-hiv-drug-in-112-countries/.
103 Licenses in the MPP, supra note 94. The MPP signed a licensing agreement with Bristol-Myers Squibb
in 2013 for a key HIV medicine, which covers 110 low- and middle-income countries. Id.
104 Id. The MPP signed two licensing agreements with ViiV Healthcare covering adult and pediatric use
of a new drug, dolutegravir (DTG), used to treat HIV in 2014. Id. ViiV Healthcare is a collaboration between
GlaxoSmithKline, Pfizer, and Shionogi. Id. The agreement has since been expanded to cover 127 countries for
adult use and 121 countries for pediatric use. PROGRESS AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE MPP, supra note 88, at 4.
105 Licenses in the MPP, supra note 94. In November 2014, the MPP signed a licensing agreement with
AbbVie for two HIV drugs for children. The Medicines Patent Pool (MPP) Signs Licensing Agreement with
AbbVie for HIV Paediatric Formulations of Lopinavir and Ritonavir, MEDS. PATENT POOL (Dec. 1, 2014),
http://www.medicinespatentpool.org/mpp-signs-licensing-agreement-with-AbbVie-for-HIV-paediatricformulations-of-lopinavir-and-ritonavir/ [hereinafter MPP Signs Licensing Agreement]. The AbbVie licensing
agreement covers 102 countries. Id.
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pediatric antiretrovirals,106 and a price agreement with Roche in 2013 for a
drug used to treat a secondary infection in people living with HIV.107 The MPP
signed a licensing agreement with Merck Sharp & Dohme (MSD) for pediatric
use of a third-line HIV drug in February 2015.108
The MPP received support from numerous pharmaceutical companies,
including Johnson & Johnson’s subsidiary company Tibotec, Abbott,
Boehringer-Ingelheim, Merck, Gilead, ViiV Healthcare, Roche, and BristolMyers Squibb, when it was created.109 The MPP has signed licensing
agreements with many of these pharmaceutical companies.110 However,
several key pharmaceutical companies have declined to participate in the MPP
at all111 or have failed to conclude licensing agreements with the MPP after
several years of negotiations.112 For example, Tibotec and Abbott have
declined to negotiate despite the fact that three patented drugs held by Tibotec
are included on the MPP’s list of targeted medicines.113 All key patent holders
need to participate and the geographic scope of licenses needs to be expanded
if the MPP is to achieve its mission to increase access to HIV medicines in
low- and middle-income countries.

106 Licenses in the MPP, supra note 94. The Memorandum of Understanding included a binding
agreement to license a drug for pediatric use in 118 countries. In addition, ViiV Healthcare agreed to license a
pediatric HIV drug currently in development for use in 118 countries once approved by regulatory authorities.
The Memorandum of Understanding was converted into a licensing agreement in April 2014. Id.
107 Id. The price agreement will reduce the price of the drug by ninety percent in 138 developing
countries. Id.
108 Id.
109 Mullard, supra note 62.
110 See GOULDING & PALRIWALA, supra note 14, at 21–22; Company Engagement, supra note 90.
111 As of October 2015, the MPP had not signed any licensing agreements or entered into negotiations
with Tibotec and Abbott. Medicines Patent Pool Announces Negotiations with Two Additional Pharmaceutical
Companies, MEDS. PATENT POOL (July 18, 2011), http://www.medicinespatentpool.org/medicines-patent-poolannounces-negotiations-with-two-additional-pharmaceutical-companies/.
112 The MPP has been negotiating with Boehringer Ingelheim since 2011 but as of October 2015 still had
not concluded a licensing agreement. Company Engagement, supra note 90.
113 Target Medicines, MEDS. PATENT POOL, http://www.medicinespatentpool.org/licensing/targetmedicines/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2015). In 2015, Johnson & Johnson began working with the MPP to support
the Paediatric HIV Treatment Initiative (PHTI), a collaboration between the MPP, UNITAID, the Drugs for
Neglected Diseases initiative (DNDi), and the Clinton Health Access Initiative, which was launched in May
2014 to “speed the development of better-adapted HIV medicines for children living in resource-limited
countries.” See The Medicines Patent Pool on Janssen’s Extension of its Access Policy for Paediatric
Medicine Darunavir (Statement), MEDS. PATENT POOL, http://www.medicinespatentpool.org/the-medicinespatent-pool-mpp-statement-on-janssens-extension-of-its-access-policy-for-paediatric-medicine-darunavir-tosupport-the-work-of-the-paediatric-hiv-treatment-initiative-phti/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2015); Company
Engagement, supra note 90.
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II. EVALUATING PARTICIPATION IN THE MPP
This Comment argues that the MPP has not attracted enough participation
from key patent holders or concluded licensing agreements that are likely to
have a significant impact on increasing access to treatment to effectively
respond to the global HIV/AIDS crisis in the post-TRIPS era. Part A reviews
the current incentives for patent holders to voluntarily participate in the MPP.
Part B discusses why the current incentives are inadequate to elicit sufficient
patent holder participation to be an effective patent-oriented solution to the
global health crisis. Part II lays the foundation for Part III in which a proposal
to increase participation in the MPP through compulsory licensing in
compliance with TRIPS will be evaluated.
A. Incentives to Participate in the MPP
Most major pharmaceutical companies have enacted their own programs to
increase access to HIV medicines in developing countries, including tiered
pricing systems for developed, middle-income, and developing countries, or
bilateral voluntary licensing agreements with generic manufacturers for low or
no royalties.114 However, these internal mechanisms are insufficient to tackle
the multifaceted nature of the treatment timebomb.115 For example, bilateral
licensing agreements between a patent holder and a generic manufacturer are
unlikely to enable the development or production of combination treatments,
which often requires bringing together more than one patent holder.116 In
addition, the impact of bilateral agreements on reducing prices of existing
antiretrovirals is limited where only a few generic manufacturers are allowed
to produce generic versions of the patented medicines.117 A patent-oriented
solution that can bring together multiple patent holders and generic
manufacturers is needed to facilitate increased access to patented
antiretrovirals.
The MPP provides a benefit over patent holders’ existing mechanisms to
increase access to antiretrovirals in developing countries because it facilitates
access to numerous HIV patents.118 By pooling together multiple patents in a
single pool, generic manufacturers can produce more affordable antiretrovirals
114
115
116
117
118

See TREATMENT TIMEBOMB, supra note 1, at 15; GOULDING & PALRIWALA, supra note 14, at 29.
TREATMENT TIMEBOMB, supra note 1, at 29.
Id.
Id. at 19.
See ‘t Hoen et al., Driving a Decade of Change, supra note 6, at 1.
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and develop new combination and pediatric medicines.119 A key determinant of
the MPP’s success will be its ability to provide a range of incentives for patent
holders to participate in the pool that outweigh the incentives for patent holders
to rely on their own internal mechanisms to increase access to
antiretrovirals.120 The MPP provides a range of incentives for HIV medicines
patent holders to participate in the pool, including but not limited to
compensation in the form of royalties for licenses granted to generic
manufacturers; positive press and a boost in reputation from licensing; the
possibility of avoiding the risk of compulsory licensing; and reduced
transaction costs.121
Patent holders will be compensated when they license products to the
MPP.122 Patent holders licensing to the MPP can receive royalties when
generic versions of the patented medicines are sold in low- and middle-income
countries included within the scope of the agreement.123 In addition, patent
holders that license to the MPP will receive positive press and a boost in
reputation for taking action to improve access to HIV medicines in developing
countries.124 Many patent holders want to contribute to global health; licensing
to the MPP provides patent holders with a definite and visible way of doing
so125 while at the same time giving them access to developing country markets
that they otherwise may not supply.126
Further, patent holders may choose to license to the MPP in order to avoid
the possibility that their patents will be used in developing countries without
their consent.127 Under TRIPS, countries are permitted to issue compulsory
licenses for patented medicines under certain conditions, including if there is a
national or public health emergency.128 By voluntarily licensing their HIV
medicines patents to the MPP, pharmaceutical companies can avoid the risk

119

See id.
Bermudez & ‘t Hoen, supra note 19, at 39.
121 Id.
122 Mullard, supra note 62.
123 Bermudez & ‘t Hoen, supra note 19, at 39; see also Mara, supra note 92.
124 Bermudez & ‘t Hoen, supra note 19, at 39; see also Mara, supra note 92.
125 Mullard, supra note 62.
126 See Bermudez & ‘t Hoen, supra note 19, at 39.
127 Id. This incentive will be addressed in greater detail in Part III.B.
128 See, e.g., Sara Germano, Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals in Southeast Asia: Paving the Way
for Greater Use of the TRIPS Flexibility in Low- and Middle-Income Countries, 76 UMKC L. REV. 273, 28081 (2007). Compulsory licensing and TRIPS will be discussed in greater detail in Parts III.A and B.
120
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that countries will issue compulsory licenses for their patented medicines.129
Finally, patent holders only have to negotiate a single license with the MPP
before their medicines will be made available to generic manufactures.130 As a
result, by voluntarily licensing to the MPP, patent holders can reduce the
transaction costs and uncertainty associated with negotiating licenses with
generic manufacturers on a case-by-case or drug-by-drug basis.131
Although the MPP provides a range of incentives for patent holders to
license to or negotiate with the pool, the MPP faces hurdles in reaching the
level of participation needed to become an effective solution to increasing
access to HIV medicines in developing countries. These hurdles are outlined in
Part B to establish a framework within which to evaluate a proposal to increase
participation in the MPP through compulsory licensing.
B. Roadblocks to Increasing Participation in the MPP
The MPP must overcome at least four roadblocks in order to serve as a
valuable tool for facilitating access to new and more affordable antiretrovirals
to respond to the treatment timebomb: (1) minimal financial incentives for
patent holders to participate; (2) imbalance of bargaining power in licensing
negotiations; (3) slow pace of licensing negotiations and production of generic
medicines; and (4) insufficient consequences for patent holders that choose not
to participate in the pool. Part III suggests that collective action through
compulsory licensing can be an effective solution to increase participation in
the MPP and overcome these hurdles.132
First, the MPP’s ability to attract key HIV medicines patent holders is
limited because there are minimal financial incentives for patent holders to
voluntarily participate in the pool.133 The lack of sufficient financial incentives
for patent holders to participate in the MPP comes in many forms, including
limited royalties from licensing agreements and the risk of parallel
importing.134
129

Bermudez & ‘t Hoen, supra note 19, at 39. This incentive will be addressed in greater detail in Part

III.B.

130

See id.
Id.
132 The roadblocks discussed in Part II.B are meant to be an inclusive but not exhaustive list—the MPP
may face additional roadblocks in achieving its mission of increasing access to newer and more affordable
HIV medicines that are beyond the scope of this Comment.
133 See GOULDING & PALRIWALA, supra note 14, at 33.
134 See id. at 4, 30.
131
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Currently, patent holders who contribute to the MPP can receive royalties
when generic manufacturers license the right to use their patents to produce
and sell low-cost versions of the patented medicines in developing countries.135
However, the royalties patent holders receive under licensing agreements with
the MPP offer little to no advantage over those patent holders can receive from
bilateral licensing agreements with generic manufacturers.136 For example,
Gilead receives royalties between three and five percent under its licensing
agreement with the MPP.137 In comparison, Tibotec, the Johnson & Johnson
subsidiary that has declined to participate in the MPP, receives royalties
between two and five percent under a bilateral licensing agreement it
negotiated with a generic manufacturer to produce an HIV drug.138 Further,
patent holders may be reluctant to license to the MPP due to the risk of parallel
importing, whereby generic medicines produced in developing countries leak
into developed country markets and erode the patent holders’ profit margin.139
To be an effective part of the solution to increasing access to antiretrovirals,
the MPP must provide greater financial incentives for patent holders to
participate in the pool rather than rely on their own internal mechanisms to
increase access to patented antiretrovirals.140
Second, patent holders have greater bargaining power than generic
manufacturers and pool administrators in negotiating licensing agreements.141
Patent holders have greater bargaining power than generic manufacturers
because they can exclude middle-income countries from licensing
135 Bermudez & ‘t Hoen, supra note 19, at 39. See also ‘t Hoen et al., Driving a Decade of Change, supra
note 6, at 8.
136 See GOULDING & PALRIWALA, supra note 14, at 35.
137 Cox, supra note 92, at 308.
138 Tibotec Signs Multiple Agreements with Generic Manufacturers to Provide Access to New HIV
Treatment, JOHNSON & JOHNSON (Jan. 27, 2011), http://www.investor.jnj.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=
545920.
139 See GOULDING & PALRIWALA, supra note 14, at 30 (noting that patent holders are hesitant to
voluntarily license their medicines because of the potential for “unsanctioned reimportation of generic
products from lower- or lower-middle-income markets into middle- or high-income markets”). See also Josh
Ruxin, AIDS Drugs-For Profit or Not?, FORBES (Nov. 11, 2010), http://www.forbes.com/sites/sciencebiz/
2010/11/11/aids-drugs-%C3%A2%C2%80%C2%93-for-profit-or-not/; What’s Behind U.S. Drug Companies’
Response to the AIDS Crisis Abroad?, WHARTON (Apr. 11, 2001), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/
article/whats-behind-u-s-drug-companies-response-to-the-aids-crisis-abroad/.
140 See Nikhil Kumar, Big Pharma and the Business of HIV/AIDS, INDEPENDENT (Dec. 1, 2010), http://
www.independent.co.uk/news/business/analysis-and-features/big-pharma-and-the-business-of-hivaids-2147
987.html; Daniel Costello, HIV Treatment Becomes Profitable, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2008), http://articles.
latimes.com/print/2008/feb/21/business/fi-hiv21.
141 See Morris, supra note 80, at 660. Gilead Sciences, for example, the patent owner of tenofovir
disoproxil fumarate (TDF), has control over generic manufacturers in negotiating its license agreements. Id.
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agreements.142 Patent holders prefer to restrict generic sales in middle-income
countries where they can already make a profit from the sale of patented HIV
medicines.143 In contrast, generic manufacturers prefer to include middleincome countries in licensing agreements so that they can reach economies of
scale faster and maximize profits.144 Patent holders also have greater
bargaining power than MPP administrators. For example, under the initial
licensing agreement with Gilead, Gilead had to give a small portion of the
royalties it received to the MPP as a broker’s fee.145 One year later, however,
Gilead amended the agreements to remove any royalty payments due to the
MPP.146 The MPP and generic manufacturers need additional bargaining tools
to negotiate licensing agreements with patent holders that are designed to
facilitate broader access to new and more affordable antiretrovirals, with
limited or no restrictions.147
Third, the pace of negotiating licensing agreements and distributing generic
medicines is too slow to keep up with the urgency underlying the treatment
timebomb.148 As discussed in Part I.A, one of the advantages of creating a
patent pool to facilitate access to patented medicines is that patent pools can
make the patented medicines available to generic manufacturers right away.149
When the MPP was created, pool administrators hoped that there would be a
time lag of only one to two years between concluding a licensing agreement
and producing and distributing generic drugs.150 However, over the past five
years, the MPP has only produced and distributed one drug, Tenofovir (TDF),
in developing countries.151 While generic production of the drug has decreased

142 See id. at 661; Cox, supra note 92, at 306–07. The inclusion of middle-income countries in the scope
of MPP licenses was one of the most contentious issues when the MPP was created. Childs, supra note 15, at
35.
143 Morris, supra note 80, at 661.
144 Id.
145 Cox, supra note 92, at 311.
146 Licenses in the MPP, supra note 94.
147 Cox, supra note 92, at 309 (noting that negotiations with patent holders involve competing interests
and that it may be necessary for the MPP to change certain terms of the licenses or create new incentives in
order to achieve more favorable provisions); see also Bermudez & ‘t Hoen, supra note 19, at 38 (noting that
licenses need to cover both low and middle-income countries in order to attract multiple generic manufacturers
and stimulate the level of competition needed to lower drug prices).
148 See GOULDING & PALRIWALA, supra note 14, at 3, 30 (noting that to be effective, the MPP needs to
make it faster and easier for patent holders and generic manufacturers to license patented medicines).
149 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
150 Mullard, supra note 62.
151 See Saez, supra note 102; PROGRESS AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE MPP, supra note 88, at 1. Tenofovir
was licensed to the MPP in 2011 by Gilead Sciences. Licenses in the MPP, supra note 94. The MPP has also
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prices and increased access,152 the long-term impact of the MPP will be limited
until more generic antiretrovirals are produced and savings are realized.153 In
addition, MPP administrators hoped that licensing agreements with patent
holders would be concluded within one year.154 However, most MPP licenses
have taken well over one year to be finalized.155 Immediate action is needed to
decrease the price of antiretroviral drugs and increase access to treatment.156
To accomplish this task, the MPP needs to be able to license and produce
generic medicines on a shorter timeframe.
Lastly, there are insufficient consequences for patent holders that choose
not to participate in the MPP.157 Since the MPP was created, there have been
numerous calls from governments and social activists for pharmaceutical
companies to license to the MPP.158 Despite these calls, several prominent
pharmaceutical companies, including Merck and Tibotec—the Johnson &
Johnson subsidiary—have been reluctant to negotiate with the MPP,159
expressing a preference to rely on their own internal mechanisms to reduce
prices and increase access to HIV drugs.160 Other patent holders have outright
distributed TDF combination drugs in 115 countries. PROGRESS AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE MPP, supra note
88, at 10.
152 Saez, supra note 102 (“The price of TDF has dropped 45%-87% in the past two years and the MPP’s
generic partners have distributed three million TDF treatments in the same time period.”).
153 See PROGRESS AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE MPP, supra note 88, at 11 (noting that “for new ARVs,
savings are likely to start three-four years after the MPP license is signed”).
154 Mullard, supra note 62.
155 See Company Engagement, supra note 90.
156 See ‘t Hoen et al., Driving a Decade of Change, supra note 6, at 7–8.
157 See Cox, supra note 92, at 319, 323 (noting that there is a need for an additional “stick” to place
pressure on and encourage patent holders to participate in the MPP).
158 See Hannah Semigran, Altruism and Profit: The Changing Role of Pharmaceutical Companies in
Global Health, HARV. C. GLOBAL HEALTH REV. (Feb. 1, 2012), http://www.hcs.harvard.edu/hghr/print/spring2011/altruism-profit-pharma/. See also Philippe Douste-Blazy & Jorge Bermudez, GSK: Please Extend Patent
Pool to AIDS Drugs, 373 LANCET 1339, 1339 (2009); Drug Firms ‘Must Pool Patents’, supra note 3.
159 Semigran, supra note 158. See also Cox, supra note 92, at 301. Merck only began negotiating with the
MPP in the second quarter of 2014. Company Engagement, supra note 90.
160 Elizabeth Sukkar, Patent Pools: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 338 BRIT. MED. J. 974, 975 (2009).
As one official from Glaxo-Smith Kline put it:
For HIV, we believe that extensive research is already underway, and thus it is not a neglected
disease. Millions of dollars are ploughed into research into HIV every year by the pharmaceutical
industry. To improve access, we already have an extensive voluntary licensing programme for
HIV across Sub Saharan Africa, involving eight licensees. These licensees are free to develop
FDCs and paediatric versions and we believe this is a much simpler approach than the creation of
a patent pool . . . [a]ll our ARVs are also available at not-for-profit prices in all Least Developed
Countries and Sub Saharan Africa. We therefore do not see the need to include our HIV patents
in any pool.
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declined to negotiate with the MPP.161 The primary consequences facing patent
holders that decline to participate in the MPP are criticism from governments
and social activists and possible reputational damage.162 While criticism and
reputational damage are significant consequences, having additional
consequences for patent holders that choose not to participate would go a long
way towards increasing participation in and the effectiveness of the MPP.
III. A PROPOSAL TO INCREASE PARTICIPATION IN THE MPP THROUGH
COMPULSORY LICENSING
As a new approach to managing intellectual property created in response to
the implementation of TRIPS,163 the MPP has the potential to reduce prices
and increase access to new and more affordable antiretrovirals if it can
overcome the four roadblocks discussed above.164 However, in order to
accomplish its mission, the MPP must find a way to increase participation in
the pool by key HIV medicines’ patent holders and conclude licensing
agreements that are favorable from a global health perspective with few or no
restrictions.
Part A provides background information on compulsory licensing and
outlines the provisions of TRIPS and subsequent declarations that permit
compulsory licensing under certain conditions. Part A is intended to lay the
foundation for Part B, which illustrates how collective action by low- and
middle-income countries through compulsory licensing could be utilized to
increase participation in the MPP. Part C discusses how developing countries
can overcome the hurdles outlined in Part II.B through a concerted effort to
TREATMENT TIMEBOMB, supra note 1, at 28–29.
161 Semigran, supra note 158. In 2011, Tibotec issued a formal statement refusing to enter into
negotiations with the MPP for darunavir and several of its other HIV drugs. Cox, supra note 92, at 301.
162 See GOULDING & PALRIWALA, supra note 14, at 4–5. The potential to avoid compulsory licensing was
listed as an incentive for patent holders to participate in the MPP when it was created in 2010. Bermudez & ‘t
Hoen, supra note 19, at 39. However, since the MPP was created, few countries have taken steps to issue
compulsory licenses for HIV medicines patents. See Catherine Saez, Ecuador Grants First Compulsory
License for HIV/AIDS Drug, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Apr. 22, 2014), http://www.ip-watch.org/2010/04/22/
ecuador-grants-first-compulsory-licence-for-hivaids-drug/ (noting that Ecuador issued a compulsory license
for an antiretroviral drug owned by Abbott in 2010); Peter Maybarduk, US Government Special 301
“Watchlist” and Developing Country Use of Compulsory Licenses for Healthcare, INFOJUSTICE (May 2,
2013), http://infojustice.org/archives/29493 (noting that Thailand renewed its compulsory license for two
antiretrovirals in 2010). This Comment argues that a more concerted effort by developing countries to issue
compulsory licenses for HIV medicines is needed to provide a sufficient incentive for patent holders to
voluntarily join the MPP. See infra Part III.C.
163 See ‘t Hoen et al., Driving a Decade of Change, supra note 6, at 8.
164 See supra Part II.B.
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issue compulsory licenses for patented HIV medicines; Part C also discusses
several obstacles developing countries may face in issuing compulsory licenses
in connection with the MPP and how these obstacles can be addressed.
A. An Introduction to Compulsory Licensing and TRIPS
1. What is a Compulsory License?
A compulsory license is an “authorization by the government to itself or to
a third party to use the patent without the permission of the patent holder.”165 A
compulsory license allows a government to override a patent holder’s rights
when it is in the state’s interest to do so.166 Compulsory licenses may be
issued, for example, when a patent holder fails to offer the patent product on
the market, or offers the product at a price that is too high for potential buyers
in the market to afford.167 The concept of compulsory licensing has been
around for almost as long as patent law itself and the laws of many countries,
including the United States, permit some form of compulsory licensing.168
2. Compulsory Licensing Under Article 31 of TRIPS
Prior to the adoption of TRIPS, patent protection for pharmaceuticals
differed among countries.169 Many developing countries, including India,
provided little to no patent protection for medicines.170 With the adoption of
TRIPS by the WTO in 1994, however, all WTO member countries became
required to provide a minimum level of patent protection in all fields of
technology, including pharmaceuticals, for twenty years.171 Within the twenty
years of patent protection, generic companies are not permitted to develop or
manufacture generic versions of the patented medicines without a license from
the patent holder.172

165 Germano, supra note 128, at 279–80 (citing FREDERICK ABBOTT ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN AN INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY 55 (2007)).
166 GOULDING & PALRIWALA, supra note 14, at 15.
167 HIV/AIDS, TRIPS, and Second-Line Therapy, AVERT, http://www.avert.org/hiv-drugs-patentslegislation.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2015).
168 See Germano, supra note 128, at 279; see also KARIN TIMMERMANS & TOGI HUTADJULU, INDON.
MINISTRY HEALTH, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND PHARMACEUTICALS 32 (2000).
169 Germano, supra note 128, at 277.
170 See ‘t Hoen et al., Driving a Decade of Change, supra note 6, at 2. India began providing patent
protection for pharmaceuticals in 2005. Id. at 4.
171 Id. at 2.
172 TREATMENT TIMEBOMB, supra note 1, at 21.
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As discussed in Part I.A, the implementation of TRIPS has led to the
increased patenting of medicines in developing countries, making it more
difficult to develop new antiretrovirals and manufacture generic versions of
patented HIV medicines.173 The least developed countries were given a grace
period to comply with the provisions of TRIPS.174 However, all WTO member
countries are required to be in compliance with TRIPS by 2016, after which it
will be virtually impossible to produce generic antiretrovirals without
permission from the patent holder.175 Despite increasing patent protection, all
hope is not lost. TRIPS includes provisions, known as TRIPS flexibilities,
which legally permit countries to overcome the patent barriers imposed by
TRIPS by producing or importing generic versions of antiretrovirals under
certain conditions.176
TRIPS flexibilities are found in Article 31, which permits “other use
without authorization of the right holder,” including the use of a patent by the
government or third parties authorized by the government without the patent
holder’s consent.177 Article 31 has been interpreted to authorize WTO member
countries to issue compulsory licenses for patented medicines provided that
certain conditions are met.178 Several points about Article 31 are worth
mentioning.
TRIPS flexibilities are only available to those countries wherein domestic
law permits some form of compulsory licensing.179 Thus, a country wishing to
issue a compulsory license under Article 31 must already have in place or must
put in place laws authorizing compulsory licensing.180 Under Article 31,
governments wishing to use patents without the patent holder’s permission
must have made prior unsuccessful attempts to gain the patent holder’s
authorization “on reasonable commercial terms and conditions.”181 Countries
are permitted to bypass the authorization provision and issue a compulsory
license without first attempting to obtain the patent holder’s consent if there is

173

See supra Part I.A.
TREATMENT TIMEBOMB, supra note 1, at 19.
175 Id. at 20.
176 Id. at 17.
177 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 31, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1867 U.N.T.S. 31875 [hereinafter TRIPS].
See also TREATMENT TIMEBOMB, supra note 1, at 17.
178 See Germano, supra note 128, at 281–82.
179 TRIPS, supra note 177.
180 Germano, supra note 128, at 284–85.
181 TRIPS, supra note 177.
174
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a national emergency, “other circumstances of extreme urgency,” or in the case
of a “public non-commercial use.”182 In the case of a national emergency or
“other circumstances of extreme urgency,” countries wishing to issue
compulsory licenses are required to notify the patent holder of its intentions to
issue a compulsory license as soon as possible.183 Authorization to issue the
compulsory license is terminated when there is no longer a national emergency
or situation of extreme urgency.184
Under Article 31, the scope and duration of compulsory licenses are limited
to the specific authorized use;185 the license must be non-exclusive;186 and the
license can only be used to supply the domestic market of the country issuing
the license.187 Finally, the patent holder must be remunerated for the use of its
patent without its permission.188 Such remuneration must be “adequate” and
take into account the economic value of the patent that is subject to the
compulsory license.189
3. The Doha Declaration: Expanding Compulsory Licensing Flexibilities
under TRIPS
In 2001, the WTO issued the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health, known as the Doha Declaration, which expanded the instances
in which WTO member countries could utilize TRIPS flexibilities.190 The
Doha Declaration acknowledged that protection for intellectual property is
important to facilitate the development of new medicines but emphasized that
TRIPS “does not and should not prevent [WTO] members from taking
measures to protect public health.”191 In particular, the Doha Declaration
reaffirmed the right of WTO member countries to use TRIPS flexibilities “to
protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for
all.”192 The Declaration permits WTO member countries to determine under
what circumstances compulsory licenses can be issued under Article 31 of
182

Id.
Id.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WTO Doc.
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
191 Id. ¶¶ 3–4.
192 Id. ¶ 4.
183
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TRIPS.193 Most importantly, the Declaration recognized that public health
crises, including the global HIV/AIDS crisis, constitute a national emergency
for which countries could grant compulsory licenses.194
Part B builds on the introductory discussion of compulsory licensing and
TRIPS to argue that developing countries hardest hit by the HIV/AIDS
epidemic can collectively utilize TRIPS flexibilities to increase participation in
the MPP and facilitate access to patented antiretrovirals.
B. Exercising Compulsory Licensing Flexibilities in Connection with the MPP
The MPP was created to respond to the changing intellectual property
environment under TRIPS through the collective management of HIV
medicines patents.195 At the time the MPP was created, compulsory licensing
was not seen as a favorable solution to overcoming patent barriers imposed by
TRIPS because it requires a country-by-country approach.196 However, this
Comment argues that the MPP has been unable to achieve the level of patent
holder participation needed to decrease drug prices and increase access on its
own. This Comment suggests that collective action through compulsory
licensing by governments in low- and middle-income countries is needed to
boost participation in the MPP to make the MPP more effective at increasing
access to medicines.197
Compulsory licensing provides a legal solution to overcoming patent
barriers that fits within the existing international intellectual property
framework of TRIPS.198 Article 31 of TRIPS permits WTO member countries
to authorize the use of a patent by the government or a third party authorized
by the government without the permission of the patent holder.199 This means
that developing countries could issue compulsory licenses authorizing the
193

Id. ¶ 5(b).
Id. ¶ 5(c).
195 See ‘t Hoen et al., Driving a Decade of Change, supra note 6, at 8.
196 See Bermudez & ‘t Hoen, supra note 19, at 39 (noting that compulsory licensing is not a systematic
solution to solving the global HIV/AIDS crisis).
197 Although MSF preferred a voluntary licensing approach in its initial proposal for an HIV medicines
patent pool, it did not rule out the possibility that a mandatory system should be adopted, if the voluntary
approach failed. Childs, supra note 15, at 34. At least one scholar has suggested that countries could support
the MPP by issuing compulsory licenses. Cox, supra note 92, at 323. This Comment explores more seriously
compulsory licensing as an option to increase participation in the MPP, in arguing that compulsory licensing is
an effective tool to increase participation in the MPP and respond to the treatment timebomb.
198 See, e.g., ‘t Hoen et al., Driving a Decade of Change, supra note 6, at 3.
199 TRIPS, supra note 177.
194
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MPP, a third party, to use HIV medicine patents, even if the patent holder has
not given the government or the MPP permission to do so. The MPP could
then negotiate licensing agreements with generic manufacturers that would
produce generic versions of the patented medicines for sale in developing
countries or to develop new combination or pediatric treatments. The
compulsory licenses could be directed to patent holders that have not licensed
to the MPP or that have licensed to the MPP but excluded middle-income
countries from the scope of the license.200 For example, compulsory licenses
could be issued to Tibotec, which holds the patents needed to manufacture the
drug licensed by the NIH, because Tibotec has declined to participate in the
MPP.201 In addition, middle-income countries excluded under the Gilead
license could issue a compulsory license requiring Gilead to include them
within the geographic scope of the license.202
Developing country governments issuing compulsory licenses would not be
required to authorize the MPP to use the patents but could instead choose to
use the patents themselves.203 However, including the MPP as an authorized
third party is essential to ensuring that the patented medicines are available to
enough generic manufacturers to stimulate competition and have a significant
impact on driving drug prices down.204 In addition, pooling the patented
medicines subject to the compulsory license in a single entity such as the MPP
is essential to ensuring that generic manufacturers have access to all the patents
needed to develop and produce new combination and pediatric treatments.205
Compulsory licenses for HIV medicines patents issued by WTO member
countries would be compliant with TRIPS and the Doha Declaration provided
that certain conditions are met. The Doha Declaration recognized that the
HIV/AIDS epidemic constituted a public health emergency206 such that the
requirement that governments attempt to obtain authorization from patent
holders before issuing the license is waived.207 However, in order to comply

200

See Cox, supra note 92, at 321–22.
See id. at 301.
202 See id. at 319–20 (noting the role that compulsory licenses could play in increasing the geographic
coverage of the MPP/Gilead license).
203 See TRIPS, supra note 177.
204 See TREATMENT TIMEBOMB, supra note 1, at 19 (noting that “where few generic manufacturers are
allowed to produce a medicine, the impact [on reducing drug prices] will be limited because competition is
limited”); see also Rosenberg, supra note 22.
205 Rosenberg, supra note 22.
206 Doha Declaration, supra note 190, ¶ 5(c).
207 TRIPS, supra note 177.
201
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with TRIPS, countries wishing to issue compulsory licenses for HIV medicines
must notify HIV medicine patent holders of their intention to do so.208 In
addition, the compulsory license must terminate when there is no longer a
national emergency,209 although this is unlikely to occur anytime in the
foreseeable future with the global HIV/AIDS epidemic. Countries issuing
compulsory licenses must also remunerate patent holders for the use of their
patent without authorization, taking into account the economic value or
importance of the patented drug.210 Remuneration guidelines used by
developing countries should be transparent and predictable to ensure fairness
among patent holders.211 Further, compulsory licenses would be TRIPScompliant provided that the use of HIV medicines patents is non-exclusive,212
meaning that patent holders could voluntarily license the patents to generic
manufacturers or the MPP on their own. However, because TRIPS requires
that patents subject to compulsory licenses can only be used to supply the
domestic market of the country issuing the license,213 a concerted effort by
multiple developing countries is needed to increase participation in the MPP
and have a measurable impact on decreasing drug prices.214
Issuing compulsory licenses for HIV medicines could also function as a
tool to increase participation in the MPP by facilitating voluntary licensing.215
Because compulsory licenses allow a government to override a patent holder’s
rights without their consent, patent holders have little control over the terms or
conditions of the compulsory licenses.216 In addition, the terms of compulsory
licenses are unlikely to be uniform or predictable across countries, creating
greater uncertainty for patent holders.217 In contrast, patent holders have
leverage and bargaining power when negotiating the term of voluntary
licensing agreements with the MPP.218 By voluntarily licensing to the MPP,
208

Id.
Id.
210 Id. A detailed discussion of remuneration guidelines is beyond the scope of this Comment. For a more
detailed discussion on remuneration guidelines, see James Love, Measures to Enhance Access to Medical
Technologies, and New Methods of Stimulating Medical R&D, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 679, 688-694 (2007).
211 JAMES LOVE, WORLD HEALTH ORG., REMUNERATION GUIDELINES FOR NON-VOLUNTARY USE OF A
PATENT ON MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES 58 (2005).
212 TRIPS, supra note 177.
213 Id.
214 See Bermudez & ‘t Hoen, supra note 19, at 38.
215 See TREATMENT TIMEBOMB, supra note 1, at 19 (noting that voluntary licensing is “an effective way to
avoid expense and damaging legal battles over compulsory licensing”).
216 See GOULDING & PALRIWALA, supra note 14, at 15.
217 See Bermudez & ‘t Hoen, supra note 19, at 39.
218 See supra notes 141–47 and accompanying text.
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patent holders could negotiate more favorable licensing terms, in particular
royalty rates, than if a compulsory license is issued.219 As a result, the threat of
compulsory licensing can serve as a bargaining tool for the MPP and
developing countries in negotiating licensing agreements with patent holders
that are favorable from a global health standpoint; the threat of compulsory
licensing may also provide a financial incentive for patent holders to
voluntarily participate in the MPP.220 This threat in itself may provide a
sufficient reason for patent holders to voluntarily participate in the MPP and
avoid the uncertainty associated with compulsory licensing.221
Several countries have already taken advantage of TRIPS compulsory
licensing flexibilities with impressive results. In 2004, Malaysia became the
first WTO member country to issue a compulsory license for HIV
antiretrovirals.222 After the compulsory license was issued, Malaysia began
manufacturing and distributing generic antiretrovirals domestically, ultimately
reducing the cost of treatment.223 The governments of Indonesia, Thailand, and
Brazil have also issued compulsory licenses for HIV medicines with similar
results.224 These instances demonstrate that issuing compulsory licenses for
HIV medicines can have a measurable impact on decreasing prices and
increasing access to HIV medicines.225 The potential for compulsory licensing
to have similar effects when utilized in connection with the MPP will be
evaluated in the next section.
C. Impact of Compulsory Licensing on Participation in the MPP and the
Treatment Timebomb
Part II.B outlined four obstacles the MPP must overcome to increase
participation in the pool: 1) minimal financial incentives for patent holders to
participate; 2) imbalance of bargaining power in licensing negotiations; 3)
slow pace of licensing negotiations and production of generic medicines; and
4) insufficient consequences for patent holders that choose not to participate in
219 See Germano, supra note 128, at 291 (noting that HIV medicines patent holders subject to a
compulsory license issued by the Indonesian government only received a 0.5% royalty).
220 See id. at 294.
221 GOULDING & PALRIWALA, supra note 14, at 35; see also Germano, supra note 128, at 279–80.
222 Germano, supra note 128, at 286.
223 Id. at 288. The compulsory license was successful in reducing the cost of three antiretroviral drugs by
eighty-one percent. In addition, the compulsory license led pharmaceutical companies to make additional price
reductions on other first and second-line treatments. Id.
224 Id. at 289–93; see also GOULDING & PALRIWALA, supra note 14, at 13.
225 GOULDING & PALRIWALA, supra note 14, at 16.
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the pool.226 Part C demonstrates how collective action by governments in lowand middle-income countries through compulsory licensing could be used to
overcome these and other roadblocks to increase participation in the MPP and
facilitate access to patented antiretrovirals.
Compulsory licensing can provide an additional financial incentive for
patent holders to voluntarily license to the MPP.227 To be compliant with
TRIPS, low- and middle-income countries issuing compulsory licenses must
remunerate patent holders for the unauthorized use of their patents.228
Remuneration under compulsory licenses issued for public health reasons in
low-income countries typically ranges between zero and six percent of the
price of the generic product.229 In contrast, patent holders have been able to
negotiate royalties between three and five percent in voluntary licenses with
the MPP.230 Since patent holders have little control over the terms of
compulsory licenses,231 patent holders are likely to voluntarily license to the
MPP if remuneration from the compulsory license would be less than the
royalties the patent holder would receive from the MPP.232 In this way, the
mere threat of compulsory licensing and uncertainty over the terms of
compulsory licenses places pressure on patent holders to voluntarily license to
the MPP.233 This threat of compulsory licensing can serve as an additional
bargaining tool in licensing negotiations, lessening the imbalance of bargaining
power in licensing negotiations between patent holders, pool administrators,
and generic manufacturers.234
Compulsory licensing could also be used to expand the geographic scope of
existing MPP licensing and sublicensing agreements. In addition, compulsory
licenses could make patents available where the holders had previously been
unwilling to negotiate with the MPP or the MPP had been unable to conclude a
licensing agreement despite years of negotiations.235 Most importantly for
responding to the treatment timebomb, the exercise of TRIP flexibilities would

226

See supra Part II.B.
See supra notes 216–19 and accompanying text.
228 TRIPS, supra note 177.
229 Marla L. Mellino, The TRIPS Agreement: Helping or Hurting Least Developed Countries’ Access to
Essential Pharmaceuticals?, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 1349, 1364 (2010).
230 See Cox, supra note 92, at 310.
231 See GOULDING & PALRIWALA, supra note 14, at 12.
232 See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
233 Cox, supra note 92, at 320; see also GOULDING & PALRIWALA, supra note 14, at 13.
234 Cox, supra note 92, at 320; see also GOULDING & PALRIWALA, supra note 14, at 13.
235 See Cox, supra note 92, at 320.
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allow developing countries to bypass the twenty years of patent protection
guaranteed to medicines under TRIPS.236 As a result, generic manufacturers
could begin developing and distributing new and more affordable medicines
right away, without first having to obtain the patent holders permission or
conclude a voluntary licensing agreement.237 Finally, by incorporating
compulsory licensing into the MPP, criticism and reputational damage would
no longer be the only significant consequences facing patent holders that
decline or refuse to license to the MPP. Rather, patent holders that do not
license to the MPP would face the very real possibility that their HIV
medicines patents could be used without their consent and on potentially
unfavorable terms by multiple developing countries collectively exercising
their TRIPS flexibilities.
By issuing compulsory licenses, developing countries have the potential to
increase participation in the MPP and make the MPP better equipped to
facilitate access to new and more affordable HIV medicines. Developing
countries should include the MPP in compulsory licenses to ensure that the
patented medicines are available to multiple generic manufacturers to simulate
competition and that generic manufacturers have access to all the patents
needed to develop combination or pediatric treatments.238 However,
developing countries must overcome at least two obstacles before compulsory
licensing can be used to make the MPP more effective at responding to the
treatment timebomb. To successfully increase participation in the MPP and
increase access to medicines, countries wishing to issue compulsory licenses
under TRIPS must have the capacity and legal know-how to exercise TRIPS
flexibilities.239 In addition, developing countries must be prepared to face and
overcome backlash from patent holders and developed countries.240
TRIPS flexibilities are only available to a country if that country’s
domestic law permits some form of compulsory licensing.241 Thus, countries
must enact legislation and have administrative procedures in place before they
can take advantage of TRIPS flexibilities and issue compulsory licenses.242
236

See Germano, supra note 128, at 279.
Id. at 292 (noting that Thailand began importing generic medicines only five weeks after it issued a
compulsory license).
238 Rosenberg, supra note 22.
239 See Germano, supra note 128, at 284–85.
240 TREATMENT TIMEBOMB, supra note 1, at 17; see also HIV/AIDS, TRIPS, and Second-Line Therapy,
supra note 167.
241 TRIPS, supra note 177.
242 See Germano, supra note 128, at 284–85.
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However, the procedures for issuing compulsory licenses are complex and
cumbersome,243 and countries often lack the legal capacity and know-how
needed to exercise TRIPS flexibilities.244 To overcome this hurdle,
organizations such as the World Intellectual Property Organization or the
WTO could create technical guidelines to assist countries in establishing
TRIPS legislation and administrative procedures.245
In addition, countries that issue compulsory licenses under TRIPS are
likely to face backlash from patent holders and developed countries.246 For
instance, in 1997, forty-one pharmaceutical companies and the South African
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association filed a lawsuit against the South
African government after it passed legislation to issue compulsory licenses for
patented HIV medicines.247 Similar incidents have occurred in Brazil248 and
Thailand.249 In addition, both South Africa and Thailand were placed on the
United States’ “watch list” after they issued compulsory licenses, subjecting
them to potential trade sanctions for failing to provide adequate protection for
intellectual property.250 The backlash is not confined to countries issuing
compulsory licenses; patent holders that oppose compulsory licensing are also
likely to face criticism from the international global health community, which
can have a significant impact on patent holder behavior.251 Developing
countries can act in concert with one another and with the international
243 Id. (quoting a WHO representative who cited a “widespread lack of clarity about the options available”
and a “lack of local legal and technical expertise to incorporate and implement TRIPS flexibilities in national
law and policy” as major obstacles to issuing compulsory licenses). See also TREATMENT TIMEBOMB, supra
note 1, at 17 (noting that there is “impenetrable paperwork” required to exercise and implement TRIPS
flexibilities).
244 TREATMENT TIMEBOMB, supra note 1, at 17.
245 See id. at 18.
246 Id. at 17 (citing “heavy political pressure from companies and foreign governments . . . not to use the
flexibilities” as reasons why countries may be hesitant to issue compulsory licenses). See also HIV/AIDS,
TRIPS, and Second-Line Therapy, supra note 167 (noting that compulsory licensing has not been used much
by low- and middle-income countries because of the repercussions these countries may face from large
pharmaceutical companies if they issue compulsory licenses).
247 Mellino, supra note 229, at 1368; see also Germano, supra note 128, at 280–81.
248 A similar incident occurred in 2001 after the Brazilian government threatened to issue compulsory
licenses for patented antiretrovirals if pharmaceutical companies did not authorize generic production of the
patented medicines in Brazil. Germano, supra note 128, at 281.
249 In 2007, Thailand issued several compulsory licenses for antiretroviral drugs owned by Merck and
Abbott. HIV/AIDS, TRIPS, and Second-Line Therapy, supra note 167. Shortly thereafter, Abbott announced
that it would not sell seven of its newest pharmaceutical products in Thailand. Id.
250 See Mellino, supra note 229, at 1376–77; HIV/AIDS, TRIPS, and Second-Line Therapy, supra note
167.
251 Mellino, supra note 229, at 1369. The lawsuit against South Africa was eventually dropped after the
pharmaceutical companies faced backlash from the international community, including MSF. Id.
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community to place pressure on patent holders or developed countries seeking
to limit the exercise of TRIPS flexibilities to deter such action in the future.252
While compulsory licensing is not without controversy, encouraging
developing countries to issue compulsory licenses can serve as a favorable,
legal solution to overcome patent barriers imposed by TRIPS and respond to
the treatment timebomb. In some cases, the mere willingness of developing
countries to engage in compulsory licensing can serve as a sufficient incentive
for patent holders to voluntarily participate in the MPP.253 However, because
compulsory licenses must be issued on a country-by-country basis, collective
action by developing countries is needed to increase access to medicines on the
urgent timeframe required by the treatment timebomb.254 Only a concerted
effort by low- and middle-income countries to issue compulsory licenses for
patented HIV medicines can represent a viable solution to increasing
participation in the MPP and facilitating access to new and more affordable
antiretrovirals.
CONCLUSION
Significant progress has been made in recent decades to reduce drug prices
and increase access to antiretrovirals to respond to the global HIV/AIDS
crisis.255 However, the global health community is facing an impending
treatment timebomb, due in part to the increased patenting of HIV medicines in
developing countries in compliance with TRIPS.256 A new collective action
mechanism is needed to facilitate access to patented HIV medicines to
overcome patent barriers underlying the treatment timebomb that have resulted
from the implementation of TRIPS.257
The MPP is a new approach to managing intellectual property designed to
increase access to new and more affordable antiretroviral treatments that was
created to respond to the treatment timebomb and overcome patent barriers

252 See Germano, supra note 128, at 294 (noting that by acting together, countries will have greater
strength when going up against pharmaceutical companies and developed countries); Mellino, supra note 229,
at 1369.
253 GOULDING & PALRIWALA, supra note 14, at 13; see also Germano, supra note 128, at 283.
254 See Bermudez & ‘t Hoen, supra note 19, at 39 (noting that compulsory licensing is less likely to reach
economies of scale rapidly because they must be issued on a country-by-country basis).
255 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
256 See ‘t Hoen et al., Driving a Decade of Change, supra note 6, at 1, 7–8.
257 Id. at 1, 7.
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imposed by TRIPS.258 By pooling HIV medicine patents in a single entity, the
MPP makes it easier for generic manufacturers to gain access to all the patents
needed to develop and produce new combination and pediatric treatments.259
The MPP faces problems in attracting key patent holders to the pool and
concluding broad licensing agreements, limiting its ability to effectively
respond to the treatment timebomb.
This Comment has argued that the MPP is a valuable tool to increase
access to new and more affordable HIV medicines if the incentives to
participate can be increased. Compulsory licensing provides a legal solution
under TRIPS to increase participation in the MPP and overcome patent barriers
imposed by TRIPS. However, compulsory licenses must be issued on a
country-by-country basis.260 As a result, a concerted effort by developing
countries hardest hit by the HIV/AIDS epidemic and least able to provide
affordable treatment is needed to make the MPP more effective at increasing
access to new and more affordable HIV medicines.
While compulsory licensing represents a viable solution to increasing
participation in the MPP to facilitate access to HIV medicines in developing
countries, a patent pool is only one of a broader set of policy changes needed
to increase access to treatment in response to the global HIV/AIDS crisis.261
More funding for drug donation programs and research for new treatments, as
well as support for global health initiatives from developed countries and
pharmaceutical companies, is needed to ensure that access to medicines is
protected “as a fundamental component of the human right to health.”262 In the
meantime, however, developing countries can collectively exercise their
compulsory licensing flexibilities to push for more participation in the MPP
and ensure that patent barriers imposed by TRIPS are not jeopardizing the
ability to respond to the impending HIV/AIDS treatment timebomb.
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